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COMMENT
PRESERVING PRESERVATION: LONG GREEN VALLEY
ASSOCIATION, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, AND
CHARITABLE TRUST DOCTRINE
ALYSSA J. DOMZAL
Across the United States, landowners have preserved 19.8 million
acres of farmland, forest, and wetlands through legal instruments known as
conservation easements.1 In a perpetual conservation easement, a landowner voluntarily restricts the uses of his land in perpetuity to serve a conservation purpose, binding future owners of the land to the restrictions set forth
in the easement deed.2 The land mass protected by these instruments is
sizeable—roughly the size of South Carolina3 and nearly one-quarter the
size of the National Park System4—and those charged with its preservation
face the threat of legal challenges in the years to come.5 Conservation
easements came into wide use in the 1980s as a means for landowners to
preserve their land while maintaining private ownership.6 Currently, land
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1. See NCED at a Glance, NAT’L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE,
http://www.conservationeasement.us (last updated Sept. 2013). The total amount of preserved
land in the country, including land preserved by conservation easements as well as fee simple
ownership by conservation organizations, is estimated at 47 million acres. Land Trust Alliance,
Land Trust Alliance Census Survey, SAVING LAND, Winter 2012, at 34.
2. See, e.g., Vill. of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135, 136 (N.J. 1986) (explaining the mechanism of conservation easements and providing standard easement terms).
3. State & County QuickFacts: South Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/45000.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
4. NAT’L PARK SERVICE, THE NATIONAL PARKS: INDEX 2009–2011, 6 (2009),
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/nps/index2009_11.pdf.
5. C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25, 26
(2008).
6. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 676–77 (2007) (“Perpetual conservation easements encumbering land were
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encumbered by the first wave of these easements is rapidly changing hands
from the original conservation-minded easement donors to new owners.7
Because the easement terms limit future residential and commercial development and, thus, landowners’ ability to utilize their property, successor
owners are much more likely to institute lawsuits to contest these terms.8
Some have argued that to protect these conservation easements in perpetuity, courts should apply charitable trust doctrine.9 In a charitable trust,
legal and beneficial title is split, and the landowner holds the legal title for
the benefit of the general public.10 If conservation easements were construed as creating charitable trusts, the easement could not be substantially
modified without a court proceeding to ensure the new terms comport with
the easement donor’s purpose.11 Many argue that this approach would secure the easements against legal challenges, as successor landowners could
not simply modify the easement terms to permit the development they desire.12 Additionally, construing the easement as a charitable trust confers
standing on the state attorney general, and potentially on other interested
parties,13 to enter into the legal proceedings and defend the charitable trust,
which commentators note could be an additional tool to protect the conservation purpose of these easements.14
The question of who has standing to enforce these conservation easements is likely to be a central inquiry in conservation law in the coming
years. Application of charitable trust doctrine and standing affects the enforcement of the restrictions on the nearly twenty million acres already unnot used on a widespread basis until the mid-1980s and courts are only now beginning to hear cases involving their substantial modification or termination.” (footnotes omitted)).
7. Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 26.
8. Id. Since conservation easements travel with the title to the property, their restrictions
bind not only the landowner who conveys the easement, but all subsequent owners as well. Vill.
of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135, 136 (N.J. 1986).
9. See McLaughlin, supra note 6 (arguing that charitable trust doctrine “ensure[s] that the
public interest and considerable investment in perpetual conservation easements is appropriately
protected”).
10. See, e.g., State ex rel. Goddard v. Coerver, 412 P.2d 259, 266 (Ariz. 1966) (“Though the
legal title had vested in the Board of Directors, the equitable title remained with those of the public to be benefitted.”).
11. In re Lucas Charitable Gift, 261 P.3d 800, 809 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011).
12. Alexander R. Arpad, Private Transactions, Public Benefits, and Perpetual Control over
the Use of Real Property: Interpreting Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts, 37 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 91, 123–24 (2003).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959) (“A suit can be maintained for the
enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney General . . . or by a person who has a special
interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons who have no special interest.”).
14. See Arpad, supra note 12, at 143–44 (noting that in a charitable trust case, the attorney
general could enforce the easement even if the state easement statute and easement deed do not
provide for third-party enforcement).
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der easement15 as well as future landowners’ willingness to convey conservation easements.16 While expanded standing may strengthen enforcement
of existing easements, it may have a deterrent effect on the creation of future easements.17 Landowners are less likely to convey an easement they
think will result in costly litigation. The Maryland Court of Appeals, in
Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc.18 (“LGVA”), recently addressed the issues of conservation easements, the application of charitable
trust doctrine, and third-party standing, finding that there was no charitable
trust, and the plaintiffs therefore lacked standing to enforce the easement.19
This Comment examines LGVA in the context of case law pertaining to
conservation easements and charitable trusts.20 This Comment concludes
that charitable trust doctrine is beneficial to securing the future of conservation easements21 but suggests that third-party standing should be construed
narrowly in order to comport with landowners’ expectations.22
I. BACKGROUND
Conservation easements undoubtedly provide an environmental, scenic, or cultural benefit to the public, and may thus be characterized as
“charitable.”23 It is a separate inquiry, however, whether the landowner
who conveyed the easement intended to impose equitable duties on himself
to manage the property for the benefit of the public, thereby creating a charitable trust.24 Maryland courts have twice addressed the question of whether a conservation easement creates a charitable trust, most recently in
LGVA.25 The related question of who has standing to enforce a charitable
trust carries the potential to greatly influence future conservation easement
case law.26
This Part first provides a basic background on conservation easements
and charitable trusts.27 Second, it highlights examples of the application of

15. See NCED at a Glance, supra note 1.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 66 (arguing that charitable trust doctrine complicates
conservation easement enforcement by increasing the number of parties involved in litigation).
18. 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013).
19. Id. at 313–24, 68 A.3d at 855–62.
20. See infra Part I.D.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part I.C.
25. See infra Part I.D.
26. See infra Part I.E.
27. See infra Parts I.A–B.

2014]

PRESERVING PRESERVATION

989

charitable trust law to conservation easements28 before detailing the two
Maryland cases that address this issue.29 Lastly, it examines standing to enforce charitable trusts, with a particular focus on third-party special interest
standing.30
A. Conservation Easements
A conservation easement is a legal agreement between a landowner
and a grantee organization, usually a nonprofit land trust or a government
agency, that restricts potential uses of the land.31 Conservation easements
generally limit residential and commercial development but may permit agricultural uses.32 In exchange for devaluing the property by limiting the allowable uses, a landowner may be paid directly33 or receive income, property, or estate tax benefits.34 With some exceptions, conservation easements
are generally perpetual,35 and the deed of easement passes along with the
land to subsequent landowners, binding them to the easement’s restrictions.36 Although conservation easements provide a number of benefits
to the public—open space, air and water quality, and scenic views, for example37—most conservation easements make no provisions for public access.38 Easement deeds generally provide for their enforcement, allowing
the grantee land trust to seek judicial enforcement to ensure the landowner
complies with the easement terms.39

28. See infra Part I.C.
29. See infra Part I.D.
30. See infra Part I.E.
31. Md. Envtl. Trust v. Gaynor, 370 Md. 89, 91, 803 A.2d 512, 513 n.1 (2002). A “land
trust” is a commonly used term for an entity, usually a nonprofit organization or government
agency, that accepts, monitors, and enforces conservation easements. See id. at 92–93, 803 A.2d
at 513–14 (considering a conveyance to a government-affiliated land trust).
32. See, e.g., Md. Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 412 Md. 45, 52–53, 985 A.2d 565,
569–70 (2009) (detailing the uses permitted by an agricultural easement).
33. See, e.g., id., 985 A.2d at 569 (noting that the landowner received $262,190.50 for the
conveyance of the easement).
34. Gaynor, 370 Md. at 91, 803 A.2d at 513 n.1.
35. See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 302, 68 A.3d
843, 848 (2013) (stating that the easement was to be “in perpetuity, or for so long as profitable
farming is feasible”).
36. See, e.g., Vill. of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135, 136 (N.J. 1986) (noting the
easement was binding on the current landowners as well as their “successors and assigns”).
37. See, e.g., Hicks v. Dowd,157 P.3d 914, 916 (stating the purpose of a land trust was to
preserve the area’s “scenic resources,” defined as “all attributes of the landscape from which visually defined values arise including but not limited to topography, rock outcrops, vegetation, lakes
and streams, panoramic view, and wildlife.”).
38. See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 299, 68 A.3d at 847 (noting that the
easement “does not grant the public a right of access or a right of use” to the preserved property).
39. Id.
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B. Charitable Trusts
A charitable trust is defined as “a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property arising as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it,
and subjecting the person by whom the property is held to equitable duties
to deal with the property for a charitable purpose.”40 In a charitable trust,
legal and beneficial title is split, and the owner of the trust property (the
trustee) maintains the property for the benefit of the public (the beneficiary)
for charitable purposes.41
A valid charitable trust has five elements: (1) a fiduciary relationship,
(2) duties of trustees, (3) trust property, (4) the settlor’s manifestation of intention to create a trust, and (5) a charitable purpose.42 In the conservation
easement context, the fourth and fifth elements are the most likely to be
contested.43 To determine charitable purpose, the settlor must manifest the
intent to impose equitable duties to deal with the property for another’s
benefit.44 The writing that establishes the trust need not say explicitly that it
is a trust, or that its purpose is charitable, so long as the settlor demonstrates
charitable intent.45 Conversely, grantor intent is the hallmark of trust interpretation, and a charitable trust will not be found if the grantor did not intend to benefit others in a charitable manner.46 The charitable purpose
prong is very broad, encompassing the relief of poverty, advancement of
education, advancement of religion, promotion of health, governmental or
municipal purposes, or other purposes beneficial to the community.47
40. Rosser v. Prem, 52 Md. App. 367, 374, 449 A.2d 461, 465 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959)).
41. Burrier v. Jones, 92 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. 1936) (en banc). Charitable trusts have a
strong history of enforcement in the United States, with the Supreme Court in 1819 rooting the
trustee’s duties to comply with the trust instrument in the Constitution’s contract clause. Trustees
of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 649–50 (1819) (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1). In that case, the Court reasoned that because the contract clause prohibits the states
from interfering with contracts, the New Hampshire state legislature could not alter Dartmouth
College’s charter of incorporation in contravention of the trust settlor’s intention. Id.
42. Rosser, 52 Md. App. at 377–78, 449 A.2d at 467 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 348 (1959)).
43. See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 318–24, 68 A.3d at 858–62 (examining
whether the easement grantor had intent to create a trust and whether the easement’s purpose was
charitable).
44. S.C. Dep’t of Mental Health v. McMaster, 642 S.E.2d 552, 555 (S.C. 2007) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 24 (1959)).
45. Id.
46. From the Heart Church Ministries, Inc. v. African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 370
Md. 152, 182, 803 A.2d 548, 566–67 (2002).
47. Rosser, 52 Md. App. at 374, 449 A.2d at 465 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 368 (1959)). The breadth of uses qualifying as charitable was demonstrated in Rosser,
where a testator had written a quasi-religious manuscript about her experience mourning her
daughter and provided for the book’s publishing and distribution in her will. Id. at 368–70, 449
A.2d at 462–63. Although the book was described as “ungodly bad” and having “no ready-made
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A key aspect of charitable trusts is that the charitable purpose cannot
be modified without court approval.48 In this court proceeding, known as cy
pres, a court may impose a substitute purpose as near as the original charitable purpose as possible.49 Cy pres is only appropriate if the original purpose for the gift has become impossible or impracticable—for example, a
bequest to fund scholarships to a specific university that later goes bankrupt.50 As conservation easements can be modified without court approval
outside of the charitable trust context,51 a court finding that a trust purpose
cannot be modified without a court proceeding is often tantamount to finding a charitable trust.52
C. Case Law on Conservation Easements and Charitable Trusts
Case law applying charitable trust doctrine to conservation easements
is generally sparse, giving even more import to a fully adjudicated case
such as LGVA.53 Analogous cases involving conveyances of land for public
use, however, have helped develop the charitable trust doctrine.54 In Balti-

audience,” the court held that the testator’s subjective charitable intent was manifested in the text
of the deed, the manuscript had the possibility of helping people in similar situations to the author,
and thus a charitable trust had been created. Id. at 370–71, 385–86, 449 A.2d at 463, 471.
48. See, e.g., Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2007) (using cy pres
to modify a charitable trust for a memorial garden after the garden area was slated for development).
49. Id. at 553. Cy pres has three requirements: the existence of a charitable trust, the trust’s
impracticability, and a general charitable purpose by the donor. Id. at 555. In Kolb, for example,
the Supreme Court of Iowa found that although the original location of the garden was important
to the settlors, the primary purpose of the trust was to memorialize their family member and benefit the city. Id. at 559–60. Cy pres thus permitted the court to choose an alternate location for the
garden. Id.
50. See Simmons v. Parsons Coll., 256 N.W.2d 225, 226–28 (Iowa 1977) (finding that although the original purpose of the trust had become impossible to fulfill, cy pres did not apply because the testator had provided for alternative disposition of the funds). The theory underlying cy
pres is that a charitable institution is merely the “agent for effectuating” the charitable gift. In re
Coleman’s Estate, 584 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). Thus, if the gift becomes impracticable, the court must seek another agent to accept the gift and effectuate the settlor’s charitable
intent. Id.
51. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-118(d) (West 2013) (providing that conservation easements, like other easements, can be extinguished by mutual agreement of the grantor and
grantee).
52. See Kolb, 736 N.W.2d at 560 (holding the gift created a charitable trust and approving a
proposed use under cy pres).
53. See Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 296, 68 A.3d 843,
845 (2013) (stating that the question of whether a conservation easement creates a charitable trust
is a “question of first impression” for the Maryland Court of Appeals).
54. See, e.g., Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc. v. City and County of Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022,
1025–26 (Haw. 1988) (concluding that a conveyance of land for use as a public park created a
charitable trust).
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more v. Peabody Institute,55 for example, a man left property to the City of
Baltimore in his will with the designation that the property be sold and the
proceeds applied to create “The Leakin Park.”56 The city proposed to build
several smaller neighborhood playgrounds instead, and the testator’s sister
sued, alleging the plan was contrary to her brother’s intent.57 The city argued that it was able to accept any charitable gift for any use within its corporate powers.58 The Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that
when a municipality holds a property in trust, the court will prevent misapplication of the trust funds.59 Concluding that the will had created a charitable trust and that the establishment of several playgrounds was contrary to
the donor’s intent to create one park, the court compelled the city either to
create the park according to the donor’s intention or relinquish its claim to
the funds.60
Similarly, in In re Village of Mount Prospect,61 a subdivision developer was required by a local ordinance to dedicate a lot “for public purposes”
with no other restrictions.62 The village then passed an ordinance stating
the property no longer served a public use and requested the trial court apply cy pres to sell the property and use the proceeds for another public purpose.63 The Illinois Appellate Court disagreed, finding the grantor’s charitable purpose in the designation on the subdivision plat reading “for public
purposes”64 and declaring that “[w]hen land is dedicated for public usage,
the municipality becomes the trustee for the benefit of the public.”65 Thus,
the court concluded that the developer’s designation of the land for public
use (although required by law) created a charitable trust, but that cy pres
should not be applied because maintaining the lot as it was remained practicable.66
Although there are many similarities between the transactions, conservation easements differ from the fee simple conveyances in Peabody and
Mount Prospect in several ways. With conservation easements, the public
is likely not permitted to access the property, so the public benefit may be

55. Mayor of Balt. v. Peabody Inst. of Balt., 175 Md. 186, 200 A. 375 (1938).
56. Id. at 188–89, 200 A. at 376.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 190, 200 A. at 377.
59. Id. at 192, 200 A. at 378.
60. Id. at 193, 200 A. at 378.
61. 522 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
62. Id. at 124. The village used the property for access to a drainage ditch and left it vacant
except for shrubs. Id. at 124–25.
63. Id. at 124.
64. Id. at 126.
65. Id. at 125.
66. Id. at 126.
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less clear than when the property is transferred in fee.67 Additionally, the
property encumbered by the easement likely remains in private ownership,
and, as a result, the grantee organization does not retain an economic asset.68 In the conservation easement context, therefore, the connection between the conveyance and the creation of a charitable trust is weaker than in
fee simple conveyances for public use.69
Courts across the country have taken different approaches to considering whether a conservation easement creates a charitable trust. In Tennessee Environmental Council v. Bright Par 3 Associates,70 a Chattanooga developer conveyed a perpetual easement to a nonprofit land trust on
approximately eight acres of woodlands.71 The easement declared that the
property possessed “scenic, open space, and recreational values of great importance to the people of the city and the state of Tennessee.”72 The easement granted rights to the developer to access an adjacent property he
owned, but prohibited construction and contained a catch-all provision prohibiting any activity that would “significantly impair or interfere with its
conservation values.”73 When the adjacent property was developed as a
Wal-Mart, the developer built a four-lane access road across the property,
kicking off a firestorm of controversy.74 The parties eventually settled the
dispute, with the developers transferring both an equivalent amount of land
and $500,000 to the plaintiffs for conservation purposes.75 In the settlement
order, the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, Tennessee, noted that the
conservation easement was a “charitable gift” within the charitable beneficiaries statute and described a cy pres process to change the easement

67. See, e.g., Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690, 698 (Me. 2009) (noting that
the encumbered land was only to be used for “residential recreational purposes, and maintenance
or access related to such purposes”).
68. While the grantee organization “holds” the easements, they are not generally counted as
economic assets because the land trust is not in a position to exercise the development rights extinguished by the easement. See Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App.
636, 653, 46 A.3d 473, 483 n.7 (2012) (noting that conservation easements involve payment for
the “termination or extinguishment” of property rights), aff’d, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013).
69. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2012-001, 5 (2012) (finding the conservation easement in question did not create a charitable trust).
70. No. E2003-01982-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 419720, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 8,
2004). This unpublished opinion is from the initial lawsuit concerning the plaintiff’s standing. Id.
The subsequent lawsuit on the merits of the case settled and thus did not result in a published
court opinion. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 698.
71. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 695.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 697.
75. Id. at 698.
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terms, underscoring the view that conservation easements are charitable
trusts that cannot be modified without court approval.76
Not all courts, however, agree that conservation easements create charitable trusts. In Carpenter v. Commissioner,77 the United States Tax Court
looked to the easement deed to determine whether the grantor manifested an
intention to create a charitable trust.78 The court considered the easement’s
stated purposes, which included “assur[ing] that the [p]roperty will be returned to and retained forever predominantly in a natural, scenic, and open
space condition.”79 The court concluded that the grantors did not intend to
donate the easement “with a general charitable purpose.”80 Because the
deed manifested no such intention, the court concluded that a charitable
trust was not created, and the parties were free to mutually agree to extinguish the easement.81 Although the idea that conservation easements create
charitable trusts has gained some traction in courts in recent years, it is far
from a settled matter.82
D. Conservation Easements and Charitable Trusts in Maryland
In an area of law with very little court precedent, Maryland has a
unique juxtaposition of two cases, Attorney General of Maryland v. Miller
(known as the “Myrtle Grove” case)83 and LGVA, both of which considered

76. Id. at 698, 700. A similar case was presented in In re Preservation Alliance of Philadelphia, where the owner of a historic house in Philadelphia donated an easement to preserve the façade of the house. Id. at 693. After the easement conveyance, the house became dilapidated; and
the Preservation Alliance petitioned the court to use cy pres to extinguish the façade easement,
replace it with covenants preserving the site as a park, and require any future building to comply
with the historic character of the area. Id. at 694. The court determined that the easement was a
“charitable interest,” but the house had become so dilapidated that the charitable purpose had been
frustrated. Id. The court thus extinguished the easement and instituted the covenants sought by
the Preservation Alliance. Id. Preservation Alliance presents the first time a court has authorized
the extinguishment of a perpetual easement, but demonstrates the charitable trust principle that the
parties are not free to simply extinguish an easement by private agreement. Id.
77. T.C.M. (RIA) 2012-001 (2012). Here, the United States Tax Court applied Colorado
law, where the highest appellate court in Colorado had not decided whether easements constitute
charitable trusts. Id. at 5.
78. Id. at 5–6.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 712 (“It is hoped that the application of charitable trust
principles to perpetual conservation easements will soon be confirmed.”).
83. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Miller, No. 20-C-98-003486
(Md. Cir. Ct. Jul. 9, 1998). In the absence of a published court opinion, the facts and proceedings
of the Myrtle Grove case are best summarized in Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual
Conservation Easements: A Case Study of the Myrtle Grove Controversy, 40 U. RICH. L. REV.
1031 (2006).
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the question of whether a conservation easement creates a charitable trust.84
The Maryland Attorney General was involved in both cases85 and argued
seemingly opposing positions: in Myrtle Grove that a charitable trust had
been created86 and in LGVA that no trust had been created.87
1. The Myrtle Grove Case
In the Myrtle Grove case, Margaret Donoho donated a perpetual conservation easement on a 160-acre historic tobacco plantation on Maryland’s
Eastern Shore to the National Trust for Historic Preservation (“the National
Trust”), a nonprofit land trust.88 Mrs. Donoho’s donation aimed to preserve
the “historic, architectural, cultural and scenic values of said land and the
improvements thereon for the continuing benefit of the people of the State
of Maryland and the United States of America” and to prohibit activities
such as subdivision and further construction.89 After Mrs. Donoho died, the
property was sold to a private trust established by a Washington, D.C. developer (“the Miller Trust”).90 Representatives of the Miller Trust, contending that they were under significant financial burden to maintain the historic
buildings, petitioned to limit the easement to a 47-acre “historic core” of the
property and allow the subdivision of the property into six additional residential lots.91 The National Trust voted to permit the amendment, arguing
that it was an “opportunity to strengthen the easement by imposing affirmative obligations” to maintain the historic buildings and grounds.92
The National Trust’s decision was highly contentious.93 After public
outcry, the National Trust reconsidered its position and withdrew its ap84. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 297, 68 A.3d 843, 845
(2013); Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 1–2.
85. The Maryland Attorney General intervened in Myrtle Grove as the overseer of charitable
trusts, and represented the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation, a state agency, in
LGVA. Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Respondent Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation
Foundation at 1, Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843
(2013) (No. 65); Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 7.
86. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 1, 6–7.
87. Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Respondents, supra note 85, at 22.
88. McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1041. The property contained several historic buildings,
including the oldest law office in the United States. Id. at 1042.
89. Id. at 1043. The conservation easement made no provisions for later amendment. Id. at
1044.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1046–47.
92. Id. at 1049.
93. Id. at 1050. Mrs. Donoho’s daughter wrote in a letter to the National Trust that the distinction between the “historic core” and the rest of the property “would have made no sense” to
Mrs. Donoho and pointed out that if Mrs. Donoho had wanted to preserve only the buildings, she
could have sold off the surrounding farmland and “thus insured herself a much easier old age than
she had.” Id. at 1050–51.
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proval of the amendment, noting that the conservation easement clearly
prohibited further subdivision of the property.94 The Miller Trust then sued
the National Trust for breach of contract, seeking specific performance of
the amendment.95 The National Trust contended that the easement created a
charitable trust and could not be amended so substantially outside of a cy
pres proceeding.96
The Maryland Attorney General then filed a collateral suit against the
Miller Trust,97 arguing that the easement was “not a mere conservation
agreement but a gift in perpetuity to a charitable corporation for the benefit
of the people of Maryland” and as such was “subject to a charitable trust.”98
Although the Maryland conservation easement enabling statute permitted
conservation easements to be amended by mutual agreement of the parties,99 the Attorney General argued that the statute did not intend to “abrogate application of well-settled charitable principles when a conservation
easement is gifted to a charitable corporation.”100 Arguing that the conservation easement and extrinsic evidence manifested the requisite charitable
intent to create a charitable trust, the Attorney General concluded that because the easement’s purpose had not become impracticable, the easement
could not be amended in a cy pres proceeding.101
The Myrtle Grove case settled in 1998; the National Trust agreed to
pay the Miller Trust $225,000, and both parties agreed that subdivision of
the property was prohibited. Moreover, the consent decree stipulated that
the easement could not be amended “without the express written consent of
the Attorney General of Maryland.”102 Although the case did not result in a
court opinion, the trial court’s agreement to the settlement terms was interpreted by some as support of the application of charitable trust principles to
conservation easements.103
2. Long Green Valley Association v. Bellevale Farms, Inc.
A decade after the Myrtle Grove case, a similar case made its way to
the highest court in Maryland. In LGVA, the Maryland Court of Appeals
94. Id. at 1055.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1056.
97. Id. The collateral suit technically named the National Trust as a defendant, but the court
immediately realigned it to a plaintiff. Id. at 1056–57.
98. Id. at 1057.
99. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-118(d) (West 2013) (“[A conservation easement]
may be extinguished or released, in whole or in part, in the same manner as other easements.”).
100. McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1057.
101. Id. at 1059.
102. Id. at 1062.
103. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 693.
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reached the opposite conclusion of the parties in Myrtle Grove,104 determining that the conservation easement in question did not create a charitable
trust.105 Robert and Carol Prigel own and operate Bellevale Farms, an organic dairy farm, on 199 acres in Baltimore County, Maryland.106 In 1997,
the Prigels sold an agricultural easement on Bellevale Farms to the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation (“MALPF”) for
$796,500.107 The MALPF is a state agency within the Maryland Department of Agriculture with the purpose of “promot[ing] the continued availability of agricultural supplies and markets for agricultural goods.”108 The
easement stated that Bellevale Farms “shall be preserved solely for agricultural use,” a restriction that would be in effect in perpetuity, “or for so long
as profitable farming is feasible on [the property].”109 The easement reserved the Prigels’ right “to use the . . . land for any farm use, and to carry
on all normal farming practices,” including the right to process, store, and
sell agricultural products produced on the property.110 The easement further
granted the Prigels the right to submit future building requests to MALPF
for approval as well as MALPF’s right to enter the property to monitor it
for compliance, but stated that the easement did not grant the public the
right to access or use the farm.111
In 2007, the Prigels submitted a request to MALPF to construct a
10,000 square foot creamery, with associated retail space and parking lot, in
order to process raw milk into dairy products.112 The MALPF approved the
proposal, noting that the operation was a “farm related use” under the terms
of the easement.113 Both John and Susan Yoder, who own property adjacent to Bellevale Farms, and Long Green Valley Association (“LGVA”), a
community association, opposed the creamery.114 The Yoders and LGVA
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against the Prigels, Bellevale Farms, and MALPF.115 The Circuit Court concluded that
LGVA and the Yoders lacked standing and suggested that they had a reme104. Id.
105. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 324, 68 A.3d 843, 862
(2013).
106. Id. at 296, 68 A.3d at 845.
107. Id. at 300, 68 A.3d at 846–47.
108. Id. at 297–98, 68 A.3d at 845–46.
109. Id. at 300–02, 68 A.3d at 847–48.
110. Id. at 301, 68 A.3d at 848.
111. Id. at 302, 68 A.3d at 848.
112. Id. at 302–303, 68 A.3d at 849.
113. Id. at 303, 68 A.3d at 849.
114. Id. at 303–08, 68 A.3d at 849–52. The LGVA and the Yoders first contested the decision
to the Deputy Zoning Commissioner, who determined that the creamery plan was consistent with
farm use. Id. at 303–04, 68 A.3d at 849–50.
115. Id. at 305, 68 A.3d at 850.
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dy only through the zoning, planning, and permit process.116 The Yoders
and LGVA appealed the case to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, arguing that they had standing on three possible grounds: as intended thirdparty beneficiaries of the easement, as aggrieved parties suffering a special
harm, or as “interested person[s]” under the Maryland charitable trust statute117—thereby asserting that the easement created a charitable trust.118
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that LGVA and the
Yoders did not have standing as intended beneficiaries of the easement.119
The court held, however, that as adjacent landowners, the Yoders had standing under a theory of special harm.120 The court then considered whether
the easement created a charitable trust such that “any interested person”
would have standing to enforce its restrictions.121 Reasoning that although
a contract may create a trust without using the word “trust” specifically, the
court found that the easement stated only that the land was preserved solely
for agricultural use, thereby failing to manifest a charitable purpose.122 Furthermore, the court held that charitable trust doctrine should not apply in
this case because the easement was potentially non-perpetual, permitting
termination in the event that farming ceased to be profitable.123 Lastly, the
court reasoned that because the Prigels were paid consideration, the transaction was primarily for their benefit, with only incidental benefits to the public.124 In sum, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Yoders and
LGVA lacked standing under a charitable trust theory because the easement
failed to manifest charitable purpose or intent.125 Furthermore, the court

116. Yoder v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., No. 8-5467, 2009 WL 6560543, at *1 (Md. Cir. Ct.
March 19, 2009).
117. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-302 (West 2013) (“[A] court of equity, on application of any trustee, or any interested person, or the Attorney General of the State, may order an
administration of the trust, devise or bequest as nearly as possible to fulfill the general charitable
intention of the settlor or testator.” (emphasis added)).
118. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 652–53, 46 A.3d
473, 483 (2012), aff’d, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013).
119. Long Green Valley Ass’n, 205 Md. App. at 656–57, 46 A.3d at 485–86.
120. Id. at 688–89, 46 A.3d at 504–05. Special harm is a cause of action by which a landowner may petition for judicial review of a government decision affecting land use of a nearby property. See, e.g., Ray v. Mayor of Balt., 430 Md. 74, 99, 59 A.3d 545, 560 (2013) (denying special
harm standing to plaintiffs who lived more than one thousand feet from the development in question).
121. Long Green Valley Ass’n, 205 Md. App. at 659, 46 A.3d at 487.
122. Id. at 673, 683, 46 A.3d at 495, 501.
123. Id. at 676–77, 46 A.3d at 497–98. The court noted that due to the “flexibility built into
the document,” it was unnecessary to apply charitable trust doctrine “to react to a change of circumstances.” Id. at 677, 46 A.3d at 498.
124. Id. at 683, 46 A.3d at 501.
125. Id.
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found the easement was non-perpetual and thus did not require charitable
trust doctrine to account for changed circumstances.126
On LGVA and the Yoders’ appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, concluding that the
purchased agricultural easement did not create a charitable trust, and therefore LGVA and the Yoders did not have standing to seek judicial enforcement of the easement.127 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the easement
did not evidence the Prigels’ intent to benefit others, a key requirement of
charitable trust creation.128 The court found that the easement’s language
limited the individuals entitled to preserve the land for agricultural use, and
thus benefit from that use, to the Prigels and MALPF.129
After determining that the easement lacked intent to create a charitable
trust, the Court of Appeals considered whether the easement’s purpose was
charitable.130 As LGVA and the Yoders argued, if the easement’s intent
was to further MALPF’s objectives, and these objectives were charitable,
then the easement could create a charitable trust.131 While LGVA and the
Yoders contended that MALPF’s purpose was charitable because of the
public benefit of rural land preservation,132 the court found that MALPF did
not qualify as a charity because its primary purpose is to maintain agriculture as a profitable enterprise.133 Although the court acknowledged that
“public benefits potentially and incidentally flow” from MALPF’s agricultural easement program, the court noted that the easement makes no mention of conserving rural land and, instead, focuses only on “profitable farming and sale of farm products,” which the court found insufficiently
charitable.134 The court therefore concluded that because neither the language of the easement nor the statutory scheme of MALPF indicated charitable intent and purpose, the easement did not create a charitable trust. 135

126. Id., 46 A.3d at 502.
127. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 324, 68 A.3d 843, 862
(2013). Charitable trust was the only theory of standing brought to the Court of Appeals. Id. at
307, 68 A.3d at 851 n.22.
128. Id. at 318–19, 68 A.3d at 858–59.
129. Id. at 319–20, 68 A.3d at 859. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the fact
that the easement: precludes parties other from MALPF from enforcing the easement; does not
grant public access; and allows only MALPF to consider a proposed use of the property. Id. at
320, 68 A.3d at 859.
130. Id. at 320–21, 68 A.3d at 859–60.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 321, 68 A.3d at 860.
134. Id. at 322–24, 68 A.3d at 861–62.
135. Id. at 324, 68 A.3d at 862.
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Without a charitable trust, LGVA and the Yoders had no standing to seek
judicial enforcement of the easement as interested persons.136
The Maryland Attorney General was thus in a difficult position of distinguishing Myrtle Grove, where, as the overseer of charitable trusts, it argued for the existence of a charitable trust,137 from LGVA, where it argued
against the existence of a charitable trust in its defense of a state agency. 138
The Attorney General distinguished the cases on several grounds.139 First,
it argued that the Myrtle Grove easement was donated as a gift instead of
being sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars as was the Prigels’ easement.140 The Attorney General also contended that the Myrtle Grove easement deed “expressly and clearly recited the donor’s intent” that the easement benefit the general public.141 The issue of perpetuity, and the Prigels’
easement’s potential termination in the event that profitable farming was no
longer feasible, was also cited as a potential distinguishing factor between
the two cases.142 The Court of Appeals found this analysis persuasive,143
and held that the conservation easement failed to evidence the requisite
charitable intent to create a trust, barring the plaintiffs from pursuing their
claim.144.
E. Charitable Trusts and Standing
As the Maryland Court of Appeals in LGVA held that the conservation
easement had not created a charitable trust, the question of whether LGVA
and the Yoders had standing to enforce the trust as “interested persons” was
never addressed.145 The enforcement of charitable trusts has generally been
granted to the state attorney general as the representative of the public interest, but a modern exception to this rule confers standing on a party who can
demonstrate a “special interest” in the trust.146

136. Id.
137. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 2.
138. Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 319–20, 68 A.3d at 859.
139. Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Respondent Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation
Foundation, supra note 85, at 37–40.
140. Id. at 39.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 319 n.37, 68 A.3d at 858 n.37.
144. Id. at 324, 68 A.3d at 862.
145. Id.
146. See infra Part I.E.2.
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1. Standing to Enforce Charitable Trusts
Generally, standing is the litigant’s right to seek judicial enforcement
of an issue, based on the litigant’s interest separate from that of the general
public.147 Beneficiaries of a trust generally have standing to enforce trusts,
but standing is a more difficult issue in the charitable sector, as the beneficiary is the general public.148 Historically, the state attorney general has the
primary responsibility for representing the public’s interest in enforcing
charitable trusts.149 The modern trend, however, confers standing on the
state attorney general as well as any “person with a special interest in the
trust.”150 Additionally, “the fact that a party may benefit from [the trust] is
insufficient to confer standing to bring an enforcement action.”151 The policy of limiting standing to enforce charitable trusts is rooted in the undesirability of “vexatious litigation that would result from recognition of a cause
of action by any and all of a large number of individuals who might benefit
incidentally from the trust.”152
2. Application of “Special Interest” Standing
The question of whether a litigant has a “special interest” is often at
the crux of third-party enforcement of charitable trusts.153 Although a
plaintiff’s interest need not be unique to the plaintiff in order to confer
standing,154 the “special interest” exception has generally been construed
narrowly.155 For example, in Forest Guardians v. Powell,156 conservation
groups and schoolchildren objected to the school district’s management of
147. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984) (explaining the elements of standing
under Article III of the Constitution).
148. See Forest Guardians v. Powell, 24 P.3d 803, 809 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (“The fact that
an individual may benefit from a charitable trust is insufficient to confer standing to bring an enforcement action.”).
149. See Gene Kauffman Scholarship Found., Inc. v. Payne, 183 S.W.3d 620, 626–27 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006) (examining the role of the Attorney General in charitable trust enforcement); see also
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12598 (West 2013) (“The primary responsibility for supervising charitable
trusts in California . . . resides in the Attorney General.”).
150. In re Clement Trust, 679 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Iowa 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Forest Guardians, 24 P.3d at 809 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391
cmt. c (1959)).
152. Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C. 1990) (citing RONALD CHESTER,
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 411 (2d ed. 1977)).
153. See, e.g., id. (examining the relationship between the trust document and the potential
beneficiaries’ interest).
154. See Hiland v. Ives, 257 A.2d 822, 824–25 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966) (finding that plaintiffs
were not barred from standing merely because others shared their injury).
155. See Hooker, 579 A.2d at 612 (characterizing special interest standing as “[a]n exception
to the general rule”).
156. 24 P.3d 803 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
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land held in trust.157 The Court of Appeals of New Mexico held, however,
that because the public school did not benefit directly under the act creating
the trust, the schoolchildren failed to prove they had a “special and definite
interest in the trust or [were] entitled to receive a benefit.”158 Similarly, in
Warren v. Board of Regents,159 a charitable trust had been created to fund a
prestigious faculty position at the University of Georgia.160 Faculty members, arguing that they had standing as either contributors to the trust or as
faculty members who might be eligible for the position, alleged the university breached its fiduciary duty by selecting an unqualified candidate to receive the position.161 The Court of Appeals of Georgia found that the trust
agreement did not “identify either plaintiff, by name, position, or association, as a member of a class of potential beneficiaries entitled to a preference,” and dismissed the case for a lack of standing.162
Some courts, however, have recognized a plaintiff’s standing under a
“special interest” theory, generally based on a specific designation in the
trust instrument.163 In Hooker v. Edes Home,164 for example, a woman established in her will a free home for elderly, impoverished widows in the
Georgetown area of Washington, D.C.165 Eighty years later, four elderly
unmarried women challenged the home’s proposed closing, sale, and relocation.166 Noting that the beneficiaries of the trust were designated by category, the Washington, D.C. Court of Appeals granted standing, holding that
the plaintiffs met the requirements set forth in the will and had a special interest distinct from the interest of the general public.167 The principle of
special interest standing was also affirmed in Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp
Foundation,168 where a corporate donor established a trust to benefit employees of his company and successor companies.169 When the foundation
proposed to dissolve and transfer its funds to another foundation, an alleged

157. Id. at 803–04.
158. Id. at 809.
159. 544 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
160. Id. at 191.
161. Id. at 191–93.
162. Id. at 193–94.
163. See, e.g., YMCA of Washington v. Covington, 484 A.2d 589, 591 (D.C. 1984) (“Persons
who have a special interest in the enforcement of a charitable trust may maintain a suit for the
trust’s enforcement.”).
164. 579 A.2d 608 (D.C. 1990).
165. Id. at 608.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 609. Similarly, in YMCA of Washington v. Covington, members of a branch of a
YMCA had standing to contest the branch’s closing because “[t]he closing of that building injures
them in particular.” 484 A.2d at 591–92.
168. 479 N.E.2d 752 (N.Y. 1985).
169. Id. at 755–56.
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“successor corporation” and its employees sued.170 The Court of Appeals
of New York found the plaintiffs had standing as specially interested parties
because they were a part of “a class of beneficiaries which is both well defined and entitled to a preference in the distribution of defendant’s
funds.”171
Some courts have embraced an even broader view of standing to enforce charitable trusts. In Kapiolani Park Preservation Society v. City and
County of Honolulu,172 the City of Honolulu proposed to lease parkland to a
developer to build a restaurant.173 The plaintiff, a Hawaii nonprofit corporation with members who lived close to and used the park, sued the city to
prevent the misappropriation of the charitable trust property.174 The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that where the attorney general elected to support the alleged breach by siding with the city, “the citizens of this State
would be left without protection, or a remedy, unless we hold, as we do,
that members of the public, as beneficiaries of the trust, have standing to
bring the matter to the attention of the court.”175 Notwithstanding this
broader view of standing, special interest standing remains the modern majority rule.176
3. Special Interest Standing and Conservation Easements: Hicks v.
Dowd
The question of “special interest” standing to enforce a charitable trust
was applied in the conservation easement context in Hicks v. Dowd,177
where the Lowham family donated a conservation easement on their 1,043acre Wyoming ranch to the Scenic Preserve Trust.178 In 2001, the company
owning the mineral interests underlying the ranch contemplated coalbed
methane development.179 The successor landowners, the Dowds, requested
that the board terminate the easement on the grounds that coal development
170. Id. at 752, 758.
171. Id. at 755.
172. 751 P.2d 1022 (Haw. 1988).
173. Id. at 1024.
174. Id. The Hawaii Attorney General, despite raising doubts as to whether the transaction
was consistent with the trust purpose, chose to support the city. Id.
175. Id. at 1025. A New Jersey court espoused a similar policy in City of Paterson v. Paterson General Hospital, where the court noted that the “manifold duties” of the Attorney General
made it understandable that supervision of charitable trusts is “necessarily sporadic.” 235 A.2d
487, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967). The court proposed that a liberal rule as to standing
“seems decidedly in the public interest.” Id.
176. Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., 91 P.3d 1019, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
177. 157 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2007).
178. Id. at 915–16. The easement was in perpetuity unless “unforeseeable circumstances”
made continuing the easement impossible. Id. at 916.
179. Id. at 917.
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made the easement impossible to fulfill; the Board of the Scenic Preserve
Trust agreed, adopting a resolution to extinguish the easement.180
The plaintiff, a resident and landowner in the county where the ranch
was located, sued to enforce the easement.181 The trial court concluded that
the conservation easement had created a charitable trust, a point the Dowds
did not challenge on appeal.182 The issue before the Wyoming Supreme
Court was whether the plaintiff had the requisite “special interest” required
to confer standing.183 The court distinguished between “beneficiaries” of an
easement and “qualified beneficiaries,” concluding that while the plaintiff
may have benefitted from the easement, his interest was shared by other
members of the public.184 Therefore, the court dismissed the case for lack
of standing.185 As Hicks demonstrates, even if the question of charitable
trust formation is settled, the question of standing can greatly influence the
easement’s enforcement.186
II. ANALYSIS
Courts have not yet agreed on whether conservation easements give
rise to charitable trusts, and if so, who has standing to enforce these easements.187 In an area with little direct precedent, courts are in need of guidance for considering this question, which will become more prevalent as
land preserved in the 1980s begins to change ownership and subsequent
landowners challenge the easement restrictions.188 This Comment argues
that charitable trust doctrine should be applied to conservation easements to
bolster the easements’ restrictions in perpetuity.189 Since landowner intent
is the benchmark of whether an easement creates a charitable trust, courts
should determine intent by considering the objective circumstances sur180. Id.
181. Id. at 916–17.
182. Id. at 919.
183. Id. at 919–20.
184. Id. at 921. The court defined the term “‘qualified beneficiary’ as analogous to the common law concept of ‘special interest.’” Id.
185. Id. After the case was dismissed, the attorney general filed suit to enforce the easement;
and the case settled, with the parties agreeing that the easement was to remain in full effect. Salzburg v. Dowd Settlement Upholds Easement’s Permanence, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation/conservation-defense/conservation-defensenews/salzburg-v.-dowd-settlement-upholds-easement2019s (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
186. Hicks, 157 P.3d at 920–21.
187. See supra Part I.C–E.
188. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 676–77; see also Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 26 (arguing
that the “growth of land protected by private land trusts . . . makes it likely that the termination
and modification of conservation easements will become a legal issue confronted increasingly by
practitioners” in the coming years).
189. See infra Part II.A.
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rounding the easement conveyance, including the language of the easement
deed, the benefits the landowner received, and the statutory framework of
the easement program.190 To best comport with landowners’ expectations
and to limit future litigation, courts should construe “special interest” thirdparty standing narrowly.191
A. Charitable Trust Doctrine Is Beneficial to Ensure Conservation
Easements Remain Perpetual
Just as courts have not agreed on whether conservation easements
should create charitable trusts,192 commentators have weighed in on both
sides of the issue.193 Some argue the benefits of applying charitable trust
doctrine, noting that the promise of land preservation for future generations
is a “key selling point” to conservation easement donors, who are given assurance that their easement will survive even if the grantee land trust ceases
to exist.194 They note that charitable trust doctrine, through cy pres, prevents modifications that may harm the conservation values without court
approval.195 In the event a conservation easement is terminated for impracticability, cy pres ensures the party who owns the land at the time the easement is terminated does not receive a windfall.196 They also note that splitting legal and beneficial title ensures courts weigh the public’s interest in
the conserved property.197 Additionally, where both the landowner and the
land trust agree to modify an easement, as in Myrtle Grove and Hicks, the
existence of a charitable trust confers standing on the state attorney general
to ensure the easement’s terms are upheld.198
Other commentators argue, however, that conservation easements
should not be construed to create charitable trusts.199 They note that com-

190. See infra Part II.B.
191. See infra Part II.C.
192. See supra Part I.C–D.
193. Compare McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 683 (“Whenever any interest in real property,
whether it be fee title to land or a conservation easement, is donated to a municipality or charity
for a specific charitable purpose, both state real property law and state charitable trust law should
apply.”), with Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 83 (“[I]ncorporating the doctrine of cy pres is an inappropriate response to what thus far has been so minor a problem as to be nearly theoretical.”).
194. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 676.
195. See Arpad, supra note 12, at 145 (presenting the benefits of applying charitable trust
principles in conservation easement cases).
196. See id. at 147–48 (describing how a landowner who purchased the property at a price reflecting its limited development potential, and then sells the property without the easement’s restrictions, could receive an unjust gain).
197. Id. at 124.
198. See supra Part II.C.
199. See C. Timothy Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, Common Sense and the Charitable
Trust Doctrine, 9 WYO. L. REV. 397, 398 (2009) (arguing that application of charitable trust doc-
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bining the separate doctrines creates an ill fit between property law and trust
law and that cy pres has more potential to harm conservation interests than
to help them.200 They point out that cy pres is a means to “second guess”
land trusts, inviting more scrutiny for well-meaning land trusts that find that
circumstances require them to modify or terminate an easement.201 Moreover, these commentators argue that charitable trust doctrine, and the potential expansion of standing to enforce the easement, does not comport with
the expectation of landowners, who “would be surprised to learn that they
have made a bargain with anyone but the organization or agency to which
they granted the easement.”202 Cy pres, they contend, is a “sword in the
hands of landowners and developers” and is an unnecessary pressure on
land trusts, which are discouraged in other ways from amending easements
to weaken protections.203
As a general principle, charitable trust doctrine should apply to conservation easements.204 Charitable trust doctrine provides two mechanisms—cy pres and attorney general standing—that ensure the land trust
and subsequent landowners are accountable to conservation interests.205
Hicks and Myrtle Grove portend a likely future for conservation easement

trine to conservation easements is “not well understood in the land trust community”); see also
Gerald Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements: A Means to Advance Efficiency, Freedom from Coercion, Flexibility, and Democracy, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 506 (2013) (arguing
that charitable trusts and cy pres “may decrease the flexibility of conservation easements, subject
the government to litigation expenses, and perhaps even replace the government holder's vision of
the easement with the view of a third party.”).
200. Lindstrom, supra note 199, at 398.
201. See Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 63–64 (“In considering this possible expansion of standing, it must be borne in mind that standing to enforce is, essentially, standing to ‘second guess’ the
decisions of a land trust and landowner that result in the termination, or any modification, of a
conservation easement”(emphasis omitted)).
202. Id. at 61.
203. Id. at 82. Lindstrom contends that the scrutiny the IRS gives tax-deductible easements is
sufficient pressure on land trusts to deter impropriety. Id. at 78.
204. See Arpad, supra note 12, at 143–49 (presenting the benefits of charitable trust doctrine
in the conservation easement context).
205. Naturally, the attorney general may not always choose to defend conservation interests,
or it may not have the resources to involve itself in every lawsuit. See Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc.
v. Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Haw. 1988) (noting that the Hawaii Attorney General chose to
support the government’s proposal to develop a portion of a public park). As the supervisor of
charitable trusts, however, the state attorney general is charged with representing the donor’s intent. RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 411 (3d ed. 2005). It is thus more likely than not that the attorney general will align itself with the side defending the conservation easement’s restrictions. See id.
(“[T]he Attorney General . . . has been chosen as the protector, supervisor, and enforcer of charitable trusts.”). But see Craig Kaufman, Sympathy for the Devil’s Advocate: Assisting the Attorney
General When Charitable Matters Reach the Courtroom, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 705, 738
(2006) (examining shortcomings of state attorneys general in enforcing charitable trusts and concluding that standing to enforce charitable trusts should be expanded).
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litigation—a subsequent landowner is confronted with an unforeseen difficulty (in Hicks, the proposed coalbed methane mining; in Myrtle Grove, the
financial burden of maintaining historic buildings) and successfully petitions a land trust to weaken or terminate the conservation easement.206
Charitable trust doctrine provides a mechanism for the donor’s intent to carry forward into perpetuity regardless of the circumstances that change or the
intentions of the subsequent landowner.207 The public also has a real, pecuniary interest in defending conservation easements—over time, U.S. taxpayers have subsidized a considerable income tax deduction for conservation easement donations208 as well as funded direct purchases of
conservation easements.209 Applying charitable trust doctrine represents the
interest of the public, as well as the donor, in an existing framework understood by the courts.210
B. In Considering Whether a Particular Conservation Easement
Creates a Charitable Trust, Courts Should Consider Concrete,
Objective Evidence of the Landowner’s Intent at the Time of the
Easement Conveyance
Settlor intent is the “guiding light” of trust creation211—in order for a
conservation easement to create a charitable trust, the settlor must evidence
his intent to create a trust, as courts will not find a trust exists where the
grantor did not intend to create one.212 The easement document, however,
need not say “trust” explicitly, as long as the easement document contains

206. See supra Parts I.D, I.E.3.
207. See McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1059 (explaining the argument in the Myrtle Grove
case that the charitable trust and cy pres framework limiting easement modification protects the
intent of the donor).
208. See I.R.C. § 170(h) (2013) (defining a “qualified conservation contribution” for income
tax deductions); see also Ann Taylor Schwing, Perpetuity Is Forever, Almost Always: Why It Is
Wrong to Promote Amendment and Termination of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 37 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 217, 239 (2013) (“Taxpayers also have a strong interest in the perpetuity of conservation easements that they have subsidized through income tax deductions enjoyed by donors.
Easements represent a significant segment of charitable gifts in total dollars even though donated
by comparatively few taxpayers, so all taxpayers bear a financial burden in the creation of easements.”).
209. See Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 680, 46 A.3d
473, 500 (2012) (noting that in 2003, MALPF received 17.05% of Maryland’s real estate transfer
taxes and two-thirds of its agricultural transfer taxes to fund easement purchases), aff’d, 432 Md.
292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013).
210. See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 649–50 (1819) (adopting
common law charitable trust principles under the Constitution’s contract clause).
211. Kaufman, supra note 205, at 712.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 351 (1959) (“A charitable trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a charitable trust.”).
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the essentials of a trust.213 Because the law does not require the easement
document to contain any “magic words,” courts are left to divine landowner
intent through a variety of means.214
1. The Language of the Conservation Easement Document
Long-established rules of contract interpretation give primary significance to an easement document in determining grantor intent.215 If a conservation easement is clear on its face regarding landowner intent, then no
extrinsic evidence may be admitted.216 The clearest example of this kind of
intent language is seen in Myrtle Grove, wherein the landowners stated that
the easement aimed to preserve the “historic, architectural, cultural, and
scenic values . . . for the continuing benefit of the people of the State of
Maryland and the United States of America.”217 This type of language
demonstrates general charitable intent, and although it does not say “trust”
explicitly, it adequately describes the principle of a charitable trust. The
LGVA court pointed to the lack of this type of donative language, as well as
provisions limiting the parties with rights to enforce the easement, and concluded that the easement lacked evidence that the Prigels intended for
MALPF to manage the property for the benefit of others, a required element
of a charitable trust.218
While “public benefit” language such as that in Myrtle Grove may aid
a court in divining landowner intent,219 it is far from the exclusive means of
determining whether a conservation easement evinces charitable intent.
Most conservation easements are negotiated from the starting point of the
land trust’s model easement.220 While a landowner has power to negotiate
the terms of the easement, she is more likely to negotiate terms related to
the physical management of the property, such as development and subdivision, than a “boilerplate” term such as the “for the benefit of the people”
term in Myrtle Grove.221 Perhaps more compelling evidence of the land213. See id. § 24 (“No particular form of words or conduct is necessary for the manifestation
of intention to create a trust.”).
214. Id.
215. See Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 351, 833 A.2d 536, 545 (2003) (“In construing
the language of a deed, the basic principles of contract interpretation apply. The grant of an easement by deed is strictly construed.”).
216. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 314, 68 A.3d 843, 856
(2013).
217. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
218. Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 320, 68 A.3d at 859.
219. McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1043–58.
220. See, e.g., Model Grants of Conservation Easement, PA. LAND TRUST ASS’N,
http://conserveland.org/modelconservationeasements (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (presenting different easement templates used by the Pennsylvania Land Trust Association).
221. McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1043.
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owner’s intent lies in the other terms the LGVA court focused on, namely,
who had access and enforcement rights, as this is something the landowner
likely paid close attention to in the easement negotiation process.222 While
the donative language of the deed plays an essential role in divining landowner intent, it is not the exclusive means at the court’s disposal to determine whether an easement document manifests charitable intent.
2. Consideration
In conveying a conservation easement, a landowner may be paid directly,223 or he may donate the easement for no consideration.224 No brightline rule exists for determining whether the payment of consideration precludes the creation of a charitable trust. Some commentators have concluded that the payment of consideration defeats charitable intent, arguing that a
transaction that results in private benefit, by its very nature, cannot be charitable.225 This view was adopted in Three Bills, Inc. v. City of Parma,226
where an Ohio court concluded that a developer who was required to deed a
portion of the subdivision land to the city for a park was paid “valid consideration,” and therefore the developer had made no “dedication” required for
a charitable trust.227 Other courts and commentators contend that a charitable trust may exist even if the grantor was compensated, often emphasizing
the benefit to the public irrespective of the nature of the transaction.228 A
Massachusetts court expressed this view in Cohen v. City of Lynn,229 where
the court concluded that a property sold to a municipality “forever for park
purposes” created a charitable trust, as a charitable trust may be supported
by consideration when a potential beneficiary “confers a benefit on the settlor” to induce him to create the trust.230

222. See Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 319, 68 A.3d at 859 (concluding the easement
did not evidence intent to create a charitable trust because only MALPF had the right to access the
property and enforce the easement).
223. See, e.g., id. at 300, 68 A.3d at 847 (indicating the landowners were paid $796,500 for
the easement conveyance).
224. See, e.g., Huber v. Kenna, 205 P.3d 1158, 1159 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (indicating the
landowners donated a conservation easement and recouped tax credits).
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 (1959) (“A trust is not a charitable trust
if the property or the income therefrom is to be devoted to a private use.”).
226. 676 N.E.2d 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
227. Id. at 1275.
228. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 702 (arguing that “members of the public as well as
prospective easement grantors are unlikely to think that the method of acquisition should be relevant to the question of whether the easement should continue to be enforced”).
229. 598 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
230. Id. at 684–85 (quoting RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE
TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 202 (2d ed. 1992)).
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The case law is unclear on the role of consideration in charitable trust
creation. On one hand, the fact that the landowner received a substantial
benefit may undermine his charitable intent; on the other hand, the public is
unlikely to care about the mode of easement acquisition in its expectation
that the easement be upheld.231 The intermediate appellate court in LGVA
reasoned that because the Prigels were paid a substantial amount and permitted to continue profitable farming, the easement was “obviously beneficial” to the Prigels; and from the court’s viewpoint, “any benefit to the public was incidental.”232
As a practical matter, all landowners who convey conservation easements are likely to see significant financial benefit, through direct payment,
an income tax deduction, or both.233 Although donated easements often explicitly take into account the public’s interest,234 the tax deduction for
easement donations makes it potentially very lucrative for wealthy landowners to donate an easement.235 The distinction between donated and purchased easements may thus be specious as evidence of landowners’ intent.
Private land conservation transactions do not cleave neatly into landowners
encumbering their land for their own benefit and landowners conveying
easements for the good of society. Moreover, the public benefits regardless

231. Compare Three Bills, Inc., 676 N.E.2d at 1275 (finding payment of consideration precluded creation of a charitable trust), with Cohen, 598 N.E.2d at 685 (finding a charitable trust in
spite of payment of consideration).
232. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 683, 46 A.3d 473,
501 (2012), aff’d, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013).
233. See
The
Enhanced
Easement
Incentive,
LAND
TRUST
ALLIANCE,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/tax-matters/campaigns/the-enhanced-easement-incentive
(last visited Jan. 5, 2014) (crediting the enhanced tax incentive with increasing the pace of land
conservation by one-third nationwide). Although compensation of the full fair market value of a
conservation easement will always be more lucrative to the landowner than a tax deduction for the
same value, many easement programs lack funds to pay full market value for conservation easements. See Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 298–99, 68 A.3d
843, 846 (2013) (noting that MALPF’s easement purchase program is “quite competitive” and
many landowners accept discounted payments for easements). Some wealthy landowners may in
fact prefer the tax write-off from a donated easement, especially with generous carry-over provisions that were in place through 2013. See Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2012-001, 5
(2012) (noting amounts of charitable tax deductions, as indicated on the landowners’ tax returns).
Relying on the tax deduction as proof of intent brings up an evidentiary issue, however, as the
purchase price of an easement is likely to be on the face of the easement deed, while the quantity
of a charitable tax deduction is found only in extrinsic evidence. Id.
234. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4) (2013) (outlining the means by which a donated easement may
benefit the public, including outdoor recreation, scenic enjoyment, or historic preservation).
235. See Tax Incentive for Conservation Easements, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/tax-matters/campaigns/how-you-can-help (last visited Jan.
5, 2014) (noting that the enhanced easement tax incentive allowed some qualified farmers and
ranchers to deduct one hundred percent of their annual gross income with a sixteen-year carryover).
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of whether the easement was purchased or donated.236 The payment of consideration should create a presumption against a charitable trust, but the
presumption may be rebutted with other evidence of intent.237
3. Statutory Framework
Another possible metric of landowner intent is the overarching purpose of the grantee land trust. In the case of a government land trust, its
purpose is found in the enabling statutory framework; in the case of a nonprofit land trust, the purpose is found in its charitable mission. The LGVA
court put this issue at the center of its analysis, finding that MALPF’s purpose was not to benefit the public but rather to promote profitable farming.238 LGVA distinguished between MALPF’s statutory scheme and a
scheme for the “charitable preservation of land for public use and enjoyment.”239 Considering the purpose of the easement program can be a helpful means of divining landowner intent for two reasons. First, landowners
may have several options of easement programs from which to choose, and
thus the nature of the grantee land trust can demonstrate the purpose they
intended in conserving their land.240 Second, the grantee’s purpose is likely
stated on the face of the easement document itself, thereby comporting with
the evidentiary requirements of deed interpretation.241
The Prigels entrusted MALPF to monitor their easement in perpetui242
ty, a leap of faith they would be unlikely to take without the intent to
support MALPF’s mission. In light of the historically broad view of what
constitutes charity, which includes “substantially any scheme or effort to
better the condition of society or any considerable part thereof,”243 the
MALPF easement in question in LGVA likely met the test for a charitable
236. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 702 (positing that the public expects easements to be
enforced, regardless of how they were acquired).
237. See Arpad, supra note 12, at 138–39 (“Receiving consideration is certainly no bar to
forming a charitable trust, but the existence of consideration may make a court less likely to find
an implied charitable trust to protect the intentions of the grantor.” (footnote omitted)).
238. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 322–23, 68 A.3d 843,
861 (2013).
239. Id. at 322, 68 A.3d at 861.
240. Compare MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 2–501(a)(1) (West 2013) (stating that the purpose
of the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation is to “[p]rovide sources of agricultural
products within the State for the citizens of the State”), with MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 3–201
(West 2013) (providing that the purpose of the Maryland Environmental Trust, a different stateaffiliated land trust that accepts conservation easements, is “to conserve, improve, stimulate, and
perpetuate the aesthetic, natural, health and welfare, scenic, and cultural qualities of the environment”).
241. See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 314, 68 A.3d at 855–56 (examining the
rules of construction in the context of deed interpretation).
242. Id. at 302, 68 A.3d 848.
243. Wilson v. First Nat’l Bank, 145 N.W. 948, 952 (Iowa 1914).
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purpose.244 Under this broad definition of “charitable,” it is difficult to see
how MALPF’s aims to preserve farmland and to maintain agriculture as a
profitable enterprise are not charitable. The fact that the means of implementing this scheme involve payments to private landowners does not indicate the purpose of the easement program is not charitable. Moreover, the
public, through allocation of a portion of its real estate transfer taxes, has
subsidized these easement payments, presumably through a shared view of
the desirability of undeveloped farmland and a viable agricultural economy.245 By choosing to convey an easement to an entity with a public purpose, the Prigels objectively demonstrated charitable intent.
Viewing conservation easements as charitable trusts, rather than merely private contracts between the landowner and the land trust, carries significant benefits for ensuring the perpetuity of land conservation. Applying
charitable trust doctrine accords with landowners’ expectation that the restrictions will be enforced in perpetuity and represents the public’s interest
in upholding the easement restrictions. In order to best divine the landowner intent required to create a charitable trust, courts should consider objective, practical evidence such as the easement terms, consideration paid, and
the purpose of the grantee organization.
C. In Order to Comport with Landowners’ Expectations, Courts
Should Construe Narrowly the “Special Interest” Allowance for
Third-Party Standing
In the charitable sector, many commentators have observed the modern trend of expanded standing, a departure from the traditional rule that only the state attorney general has the right to enforce charitable trusts.246 The
expansion of standing relies on solid policy grounds, as attorneys general
are often pressed for resources or subject to political pressure, leaving many
trusts without oversight.247 Many commentators, however, have advocated
244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959) (including “governmental or municipal purposes” as well as “other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the
community” among the purposes that qualify as “charitable”). The generality of permissible charitable uses is based on the oft-cited Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601. Id. at
cmt. a.
245. See Brief of Appellants at 16, Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432
Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013) (No. 65) (“[F]ew programs are so completely infused with a public
purpose and function, are so dedicated expressly to benefiting and protecting the public, and are so
specifically tailored to provide these public benefits with the cooperation and support of the public
itself [as MALPF is].”).
246. See CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 205, § 414 (“If Attorney General enforcement remains lax, the number of specially interested beneficiaries granted standing to sue can
be expected to increase.”).
247. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 205, at 726–28 (detailing the potential problems of attorney general oversight).
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a narrow view of “special interest” standing, noting the potential for “frequent, ill-considered suits leading to unnecessary litigation.”248
1. The Need for Narrow Construction of “Special Interest”
Standing in Conservation Easements
Although charitable trusts are often thought to be a benign way to ensure future enforcement of conservation easements,249 LGVA represents the
potential downside of liberal standing in charitable trust enforcement. The
interests of the easement donor and the party seeking standing may be opposed.250 Myrtle Grove may represent the ideal scenario for the use of charitable trust doctrine—a subsequent landowner attempting to unencumber
the land for pecuniary gain.251 LGVA, however, represents a stickier scenario—neighbors who arguably qualify as “special interest” holders,252 suing
to enforce the easement during the ownership of the original easement seller. LGVA demonstrates the potential danger of burdensome litigation resulting from applying charitable trust doctrine to conservation easements.253
While the expansion of standing to enforce charitable trusts may have
general benefits in strengthening enforcement, conservation easements’ root
in property law differentiate them from other charitable transactions.254 Unlike, for example, the cases of a university faculty position255 or a home for
elderly widows,256 adjacent landowners such as the Yoders have an existing
property interest and a host of legal remedies outside the trust context.257

248. CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 205, § 414.
249. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 712 (advocating for application of charitable trust principles to conservation easements to “ensure that the public interest and considerable investment in
perpetual conservation easements is appropriately protected”).
250. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 296, 68 A.3d 843, 845
(2013); see also Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 66–67 (noting the disadvantages of expanded standing by applying charitable trust doctrine to conservation easements).
251. See McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1045–50 (detailing the developer’s attempt to amend
the Myrtle Grove conservation easement to permit further development).
252. See Grabowski v. City of Bristol, 780 A.2d 953, 955 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (finding a
landowner adjacent to a public park had standing to sue in the absence of the attorney general’s
participation).
253. See CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 205, § 414 (“The courts usually require
that suits for enforcement be brought by the established representative of the charity, the Attorney
General, so that the trustees may not be vexed by frequent, ill-considered suits leading to unnecessary litigation.”).
254. See Arpad, supra note 12, at 109 (examining the nature of the property right conveyed in
a conservation easement).
255. Warren v. Bd. Of Regents, 544 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
256. Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608 (D.C. 1990).
257. See, e.g., Ray v. Mayor of Balt., 430 Md. 74, 85, 59 A.3d 545, 551 (2013) (noting that in
a zoning appeal case, a landowner is “prima facie aggrieved when his proximity makes him an
adjoining, confronting, or nearby property owner”).
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As the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted, the Yoders were prima
facie aggrieved as adjacent landowners under a theory of special harm, and
could have demonstrated facts of the creamery’s negative impact on remand.258 A cause of action for special harm confers standing on a landowner “whose personal or property rights are adversely affected by” a governmental land use decision and, thus, provides a more general cause of
action to object to land use decisions that affect one’s property.259 If the
goal of expanding standing is to guarantee a day in court for those who object to the management of a trust, in the conservation easement context
“special interest” standing may be duplicative and merely another tool in
the arsenal of disgruntled neighbors.260
2. A Proposed Balancing Test to Evaluate Special Interest Standing
In order to balance the competing interests of ensuring future enforcement of charitable trusts and deterring excessive litigation, courts should
adopt a balancing test to evaluate “special interest” standing.261 The factors,
as proposed by Professors Blasko, Crossley, and Lloyd, are: (1) the extraordinary nature of the acts alleged; (2) the presence of bad faith; (3) the availability of the attorney general; and (4) the nature of the benefitted class.262
This test was applied to assess third-party standing in the case of Schalkenbach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation.263 In that case, the Arizona Court
of Appeals found the plaintiffs did not have standing because there was no
“sharply defined” class to which the plaintiffs belonged, the actions alleged
(improperly transferring funds to organizations that did not follow the
trust’s distinct purpose) were not sufficiently extraordinary, and the attorney general’s lack of involvement was not due to a neglect of the public interest.264 Applying similar factors to arrive at an opposite conclusion, the
New York case of Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Foundation265 found that the
258. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 689, 46 A.3d 473,
505 (2012), aff’d, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013).
259. Ray, 430 Md. at 81, 59 A.3d at 549 (quoting Bryniarski v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 144, 230 A.2d 289, 294 (1967)).
260. See Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 66–67 (presenting expanded standing as a potential
drawback of applying charitable trust doctrine to conservation easements).
261. But see id. at 81 (arguing that limiting standing is insufficient to protect land trusts from
unnecessary litigation).
262. Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley & David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in the Charitable
Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 61–74 (1993). The Blasko test includes a fifth element, “subjective
factors and social desirability,” which the authors acknowledge “should not be overemphasized.”
Id. at 74. Due to its subjectivity and potential to detract from the other elements, that element is
omitted here.
263. 91 P.3d 1019 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
264. Id. at 1026–28.
265. 479 N.E.2d 752 (N.Y. 1985).
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proposed dissolution of the charity was sufficiently drastic and the benefitted class sufficiently defined to confer standing.266
3. Using a Balancing Test to Assess Special Interest Standing in
LGVA
The balancing test thus provides an administrable framework for
courts to consider whether a particular third-party plaintiff has standing to
enforce a charitable trust. In applying the balancing test to LGVA, it is likely that even if the Maryland Court of Appeals had determined a charitable
trust had been created, the Yoders and LGVA would not have had standing.
The first factor is perhaps the most determinative—the act of constructing a
10,000-foot creamery on a 199-acre property,267 in accordance with a conservation easement term allowing structures associated with the sale of agricultural goods, is simply not as egregious as the acts alleged in many charitable trust cases.268 The LGVA court was arguably influenced by the relarelative mildness of the allegations; one can imagine that if the facts had
mirrored Myrtle Grove’s proposed subdivision or Hicks’s proposed coalbed
methane development, the court would have been more inclined to expand
standing.
Regarding the second factor of fraud or bad faith, the Yoders and
LGVA did not allege that the creamery was proposed in bad faith, weakening their argument for standing.269 Turning to the third factor of attorney
general involvement, in LGVA the attorney general was an integral part of
the case, albeit in its capacity defending the state agency that held the easement, not overseeing the charitable trust.270 In the final factor, the nature of
the benefitted class, the Yoders’ strongest argument for standing emerges.
While a conservation easement is unlikely to have a “sharply defined” class

266. Id. at 755–56.
267. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 302–03, 68 A.3d 843,
849 (2013).
268. See, e.g., In re Milton Hershey Sch., 911 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. 2006) (observing that the
charity’s alleged misappropriation of funds impeded the charitable purpose such that there was no
risk of vexatious litigation).
269. Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 308–10, 68 A.3d at 852–53.
270. Id. at 295, 68 A.3d at 844. The position of MALPF in this case demonstrates a potential
conflict peculiar to Maryland, where eighty-one percent of easements are held by state agencies,
so the attorney general will be involved in litigation irrespective of whether there is a charitable
trust.
NAT’L
CONSERVATION
EASEMENT
DATABASE,
http://www.conservationeasement.us/reports/easements (last visited Mar. 18, 2014). Maryland’s
conservation easement scheme differs strikingly from other states, like Wyoming, for example,
where 87.2% of easements are held by private land trusts. Id. See also Arpad, supra note 12, at
143–44 (differentiating Maryland conservation easement precedent from states with primarily privately held easements).
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of beneficiaries mentioned in the trust instrument,271 an adjacent landowner
does indeed benefit particularly from his neighbor’s conservation easement
and may likewise be particularly harmed by a neighbor’s decision to build a
creamery. 272 These issues, however, are separate from the enforcement of a
charitable trust and are adequately addressed in the land use context. Had
the LGVA court applied a balancing test such as the Blasko test,273 it is unlikely that it would have conferred standing on LGVA and the Yoders.
By interpreting “special interest” standing narrowly, courts can limit
the litigation exposure of well-meaning landowners who grant conservation
easements, thereby promoting the social good of land preservation. If the
LGVA court had treated standing as a threshold issue and reasoned that even
if the easement had created a charitable trust, the Yoders and LGVA did not
meet the standard for having a special interest by the balancing test described above, it could have dismissed the case without a lengthy, complex
debate about charitable trust doctrine.274 Had the Yoders and LGVA been
successful, the litigation would have developed in three parts, at great expense to all parties: determining whether there was a charitable trust,
whether the plaintiffs had standing as specially interested parties, and only
then whether there was a legitimate easement violation. The public has expressed, through subsidizing tax deductions and easement purchase programs, that land preservation is a social good.275 Courts should adopt a policy that encourages, rather than chills, the conveyance of conservation
easements. No landowner would grant an easement with the expectation of
giving his neighbor standing to sue him for his land management decisions.276 If landowner intent is truly the “guiding light” of charitable trust
administration,277 courts should construe standing very narrowly in this are-

271. Alco Gravure, Inc., 479 N.E.2d at 755.
272. See Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 689, 46 A.3d
473, 505 (2012) (granting the Yoders “neighbor property owner standing” to prove the creamery
specially harmed them on remand), aff’d, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013).
273. See Blasko, Crossley & Lloyd, supra note 262, at 61–74 (using five factors to evaluate
“special interest” standing).
274. This procedure mimics the structure of other land use claims, including special harm, in
which standing is treated as a threshold issue. See Ray v. Mayor of Balt., 430 Md. 74, 99, 59 A.3d
545, 560 (holding that the residents challenging the construction of a development had not proved
the specialized harm required for standing).
275. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4) (2013) (listing the public benefit standards for tax-deductible conservation easements).
276. See Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 66 (arguing that applying cy pres “will complicate the
enforcement of conservation easements because enforcement may involve multiple parties and the
attendant increase in the time and cost of litigation”).
277. Kaufman, supra note 205, at 712.
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na. The more efficiently these cases are handled, the less likely they are to
have a chilling effect on future easement donations.278
III. CONCLUSION
Land conservation in the United States is on the cusp of a defining legal era. With over 100,000 easements covering the equivalent of the area of
South Carolina, legal challenges are inevitable as preserved land changes
hands.279 To face these impending challenges, courts need an administrable
legal framework that both carries forth the intent of landowners who conveyed easements and encourages future easements.280 Applying charitable
trust doctrine is a positive step toward strengthening easement enforcement,
but it must be administered in a manner that does not encourage cumbersome, expensive litigation for landowners.281 Such efficient litigation can
be accomplished by a strict construction of third-party standing, which will
ensure landowners who previously conveyed easements are not sued unnecessarily, while conferring standing on those defending the easement grantor’s vision of his land.282

278. See Lindstrom, supra note 199, at 412 (noting the “uncertainty and potential bureaucratic
burden on the daily administration of conservation easements that could arise from a broad application of the charitable trust doctrine”).
279. See NCED at a Glance, supra note 1.
280. See supra Part II.B.
281. See supra Part II.A.
282. See supra Part II.C.

